Inter-Services Intelligence

Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence
Agency overview
Formed 1948
Jurisdiction Government of Pakistan
Headquarters Islamabad, Pakistan
Agency executive Lieutenant General Ahmad Shuja Pasha, PA Director General
Inter-Services Intelligence
Coat of arms of Pakistan.svg
Faith, Unity, Discipline
Director  : Ahmad Shuja Pasha
Department  : Military of Pakistan
Established  : 1948
Major departments:
  • Joint Intelligence X (JIX)
  • Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB)
  • Joint Counter Intelligence Bureau (JCIB)
  • Joint Intelligence North (JIN)
  • Joint Intelligence Miscellaneous (JIM)
  • Joint Signal Intelligence Bureau (JSIB)
  • Joint Intelligence Technical (JIT)
Notable Directors:
  • Akhtar Abdur Rahman
  • Hamid Gul
  • Asad Durrani
  • Mahmud Ahmed
  • Ehsan ul Haq
  • Ashfaq Parvez Kayani
  • Nadeem Taj

The Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (more commonly known as Inter-Services Intelligence or simply by its initials ISI) is Pakistan's premier intelligence agency. It is the largest of the three intelligence agencies of Pakistan, the other being the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and Military Intelligence (MI).

ISI was established as an independent intelligence agency in 1948 in order to strengthen the sharing of military intelligence between the three branches of Pakistan's armed forces in the aftermath of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947, which had exposed weaknesses in intelligence gathering, sharing and coordination between the Pakistan Army, Air Force and Navy.

ISI's headquarters are situated in Islamabad. It is currently headed by Lieutenant General Ahmad Shuja Pasha, who took over as ISI's Director in September 2008.

Contents

History

After independence in 1947, two new intelligence agencies were created in Pakistan: the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the Military Intelligence (MI). However, the weak performance of the MI in sharing intelligence between the Army, Navy and Air Force during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947 led to the creation of the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in 1948.[1] The ISI was structured to be manned by officers from the three main military services, and to specialize in the collection, analysis and assessment of external intelligence, either military or non-military.[1] The ISI was the brainchild of Australian-born British Army officer, Major General R. Cawthome, then Deputy Chief of Staff in the Pakistan Army.[1][2] Initially, the ISI had no role in the collection of internal intelligence, with the exception of the North-West Frontier Province and Azad Kashmir.[1]

In the late 1950s, when Ayub Khan became the President of Pakistan, he expanded the role of ISI in monitoring opposition politicians, and sustaining military rule in Pakistan.[2] The ISI was reorganised in 1966 after intelligence failures in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965[3], and expanded in 1969. Khan entrusted the ISI with the responsibility for the collection of internal political intelligence in East Pakistan. Later on, during the Baloch nationalist revolt in Balochistan in the mid-1970s, the ISI was tasked with performing a similar intelligence gathering operation.[3]

The ISI lost its importance during the regime of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who was very critical of its role during the 1970 general elections, which triggered off the events leading to the partition of Pakistan and emergence of Bangladesh.[3]

After General Zia ul-Haq seized power in July 1977, the ISI was expanded by making it responsible for the collection of intelligence about the Sindh-based Pakistan Communist Party and various political parties such as the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP).[3]

The Soviet-Afghan war of the 1980s saw the enhancement of the covert action capabilities of the ISI by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). A special Afghan Section was created under the command of colonel Mohammed Yousaf to oversee the coordination of the war. A number of officers from the ISI's Covert Action Division received training in the US and many covert action experts of the CIA were attached to the ISI to guide it in its operations against the Soviet troops by using the Afghan Mujahideen.

Organization

ISI's headquarters are located in Islamabad and currently the head of the ISI is called the Director General who has to be a serving Lieutenant General in the Pakistan Army. Under the Director General, three Deputy Director Generals report directly to him and are in charge in three separate fields of the ISI which are Internal wing - dealing with counter-intelligence and political issues inside Pakistan, External wing - handling external issues, and Analysis and Foreign Relations wing.[4]

The general staff of the ISI mainly come from paramilitary forces and some specialized units from the Pakistan Army such as the some chosen people from special services group(SSG) . While the total number has never been made public, experts estimate about 10,000 officers and staff members, which does not include informants and assets.[2]

Departments

In addition, there are also separate explosives and a chemical warfare sections.[2]

Directors

  1. Major General R. Cawthome. 1948-1956
  2. Brig Riaz Hussain.[5] 1959 - 1966
  3. Maj Gen (then Brig) Mohammad Akbar Khan.[6] 1966 - 1971
  4. Lt Gen (then Maj Gen) Ghulam Jilani Khan. 1971 - 1978
  5. Lt Gen Muhammad Riaz. 1978 - 1980
  6. Lt Gen Akhtar Abdur Rahman. 1980 - March 1987
  7. Lt Gen Hamid Gul. March 1987 - May 1989
  8. Lt Gen (retd) Shamsur Rahman Kallu. May 1989 - August 1990
  9. Lt Gen Asad Durrani. August 1990 - March 1992
  10. Lt Gen Javed Nasir. March 1992 - May 1993
  11. Lt Gen Javed Ashraf Qazi. May 1993 - 1995
  12. Lt Gen (then Maj Gen) Naseem Rana. 1995 - October 1998
  13. Lt Gen Ziauddin Butt . October 1998 - October 1999
  14. Lt Gen Mahmud Ahmed. October 1999 - October 2001
  15. Lt Gen Ehsan ul Haq. October 2001 - October 2004
  16. Lt Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani. October 2004 - October 2007
  17. Lt Gen Nadeem Taj. October 2007 - October 2008
  18. Lt Gen Ahmad Shuja Pasha. October 2008–Present

Recruitment and training

Both civilians and members of the armed forces can join the ISI. For civilians, recruitment is advertised and is jointly handled by the Federal Public Services Commission (FPSC) and civilian ISI agents are considered employees of the Ministry of Defense. The FPSC conducts various examinations testing the candidate's knowledge of current affairs, English and various analytical abilities. Based on the results, the FPSC shortlists the candidates and sends the list to the ISI who conduct the initial background checks. The selected candidates are then invited for an interview which is conducted by a joint committee comprising both ISI and FPSC officials.

Those candidates who passed the interview then have to go through rigorous fitness, medical and psychological evaluations. Once the candidate clears these evaluations, the ISI performs a very thorough background check on the candidate before being offered to join the ISI. Security clearance is granted once the candidate accepts the offer. Recruited agents then go to the Inter-Services Intelligence School for basic training following which they are employed on an initial one year probationary period. However, civilian operatives are not allowed to rise above the equivalent of the rank of Major and are mostly assigned to JIX, JIB and JCIB departments and the rest of the departments are solely headed by the armed forces but there have been rare cases in which civilians have been assigned to those departments.

For the armed forces, officers have to apply for admission into the Inter-Services Intelligence School. After finishing the intelligence course, they can apply to be posted in Field Intelligence Units or in the directorate of Military/Air/Naval intelligence. Then they wait and hope that their performance is good enough to be invited to the ISI for a temporary posting. Based on their performance in the military and the temporary posting with ISI, they are then offered a more permanent position.

Senior ISI officers with ranks of Major and above are only assigned to the ISI for no more than two to three years to curtail the attempt to abuse their power. Almost all of the Director-Generals of the ISI have never served in the organization before being appointed by the military commanders to lead it. ISI also monitors former, current and retired military officers who at one point or another held sensitive positions and had access to classified data.However in some special circumstances officers with outstanding achievements are given an extended appointment and even a lifetime (till 60 years of age) job.

Operations

Functions

Collection of information and extraction of intelligence from information: ISI obtains information critical to Indian strategic interests. Both overt and covert means are adopted.

Classification of intelligence: Data is sifted through, classified as appropriate, and filed with the assistance of the computer network in ISI's headquarters in Islamabad.

Aggressive intelligence: The primary mission of ISI includes aggressive intelligence which comprises espionage, psychological warfare, subversion, sabotage.

Counterintelligence: ISI has a dedicated section which spies against enemy's intelligence collection.

Methods

Diplomatic missions: Diplomatic missions provide an ideal cover and ISI centers in a target country are generally located on the embassy premises.

Multinationals: ISI operatives find good covers in multinational organizations. Non-governmental organizations and cultural programmes are also popular screens to shield ISI activities.

Media: International media centers can easily absorb ISI operatives and provide freedom of movement.

Collaboration with other agencies: ISI maintains active collaboration with other secret services in various countries. Its contacts with Saudi Arabian Intelligence Services, Chinese Intelligence, the American CIA and British MI6 have been well-known.

Third Country Technique: ISI has been active in obtaining information and operating through third countries like Afghanistan, Nepal, the United Kingdom, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Iran, Turkey and China.

Operations History

Afghanistan

Akhtar Abdur Rahman, the key architect of the Afghan resistance against Soviet union

India

A declassified US State Department telegram that confirms the existence of Pakistani infiltrators in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir in 1965.

If Indian intelligence sources are to be believed, Indian Mujahedeen(IM) serves as the vanguard of the ISI sponsored 'Karachi Project', which allegedly uses groups like the LeT and HuJI to train Indian operatives to carry out blasts in major urban centres as part of a continuous offensive against India. Tracing its origins to the Soviet-Afghan War, HuJI is a terrorist outfit based in Pakistan with an affiliate in Bangladesh with strong links to Al-Qa'ida. Theses suspicions are supported by David Coleman Headley, also known as Daood Gilani, the prime suspect in LeT's Chicago conspiracy, who has allegedly informed the FBI about 'the LeT and ISI sheltering chief IM operatives like the Bhatkal brothers and serving and retired Pakistan Army officers being part of the project'. Headley is a Pakistani-American businessman implicated by the FBI for his role in plotting the 2008 Mumbai attacks in association with LeT.[27][28]

The unconfirmed presence of Indian Mujahedeen(IM) bases in neighbouring countries may provide some clues about the contours of the 'Karachi Project'. If indeed an operational reality, the strategy would have three major objectives: firstly, to give an Indian face to the bombing campaign without raising suspicions of Pakistani involvement; secondly, to undermine India's rising economic profile by targeting major economic centres thus curbing foreign direct investment and thirdly, to provoke tougher anti-terrorist laws and major communal tensions between the Hindu and Muslim communities creating a fresh crop of disgruntled recruits for the Jihadist cause. The aim would be to create widespread mayhem to stall the Indian economic engine and weaken the writ of the state.[29]

The allegations about the 'Karachi Project' are indicative of Islamabad's continued reluctance in clamping down on cross-border terrorism against India. US National Intelligence Director (Retd) Admiral Dennis Blair attributes this to 'Islamabad's conviction that militant groups are an important part of its strategic arsenal to counter India's military and economic advantages'. While a spectacular attack like the one witnessed in Mumbai may not be on the cards due to the possibility of sparking a major Indo-Pakistan confrontation, a series of blasts targeting major urban centres and high-profile events such as the Indian Premier League and the forthcoming 2010 Commonwealth Games in Delhi is a real threat for the Indian establishment.[30][31]

Pakistan

Libya

Iran

France

Soviet Union and Post-Soviet states

United States

Captures

Controversies

Critics of the ISI say that it has become a state within a state (since the Army is the one accused of being a state within a state), answerable neither to the leadership of the army, nor to the President or the Prime Minister.[48]. After much criticism, the Pakistani Government disbanded the ISI 'Political Wing' in 2008.[49]

Domestic activities

The ISI has been deeply involved in domestic politics of Pakistan since the late 1950s. The 1990 elections for example were widely believed to have been rigged by the ISI in favor of the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) party, a conglomerate of nine mainly rightist parties by the ISI under Lt. General Hameed Gul, to ensure the defeat of Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) in the polls.[2] Gul has denied that the vote was rigged. In early 1990s ISI became involved in politics of Karachi, it launched operation against the Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) seeing its growing terrorist activities in the province of Sindh.[50] ISI's Internal Political Division has been accused by various members of the Pakistan People's Party in assassinating Shahnawaz Bhutto, one of the two brothers of Benazir Bhutto, through poisoning in the French Riviera in the middle of 1985 in an attempt to intimidate her into not returning to Pakistan for directing the movement against Zia's Military government, but no proof has been found implicating the ISI.[8]

The ISI was also involved in a massive corruption scandal the Mehran bank scandal dubbed "Mehrangate", in which top ISI and Army brass were given large sums of money by Yunus Habib (the owner of Mehran Bank) to deposit ISI's foreign exchange reserves in Mehran Bank.[51] This was against government policy, as such banking which involves government institutions can only be done through state-owned financial institutions and not private banks. When the new director of the ISI was appointed and then proceeded to withdraw the money from Mehran Bank and back into state-owned financial institutions, the money had been used up in financing Habib's "extracurricular" activities. On April 20, 1994, Habib was arrested and the scandal became public.

Activities in India and Afghanistan

From data collected on Islamic insurgents in Kashmir, India has blamed the ISI for training, arming and giving logistics to the separatists who are fighting the Indian security forces in Kashmir.[8] The Federation of American Scientists reports that the Inter-Service Intelligence, is the main supplier of funds and arms to the separatist groups.[2] The British Government had stated there is a 'clear link' between Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence and three major terrorist outfits[52] The Guardian newspaper had uncovered evidence that Kashmiri separatists were openly raising funds and training new recruits and that the ISI's Kashmir cell was instrumental in funding and controlling these outfits.[53] India also accused ISI of masterminding the 1993 Mumbai bombings, with backing from Dawood Ibrahim's D-Company.[8] Aside from Kashmir, India accuses the ISI of running training camps near the border of Bangladesh in late 1990s where India claims the ISI trains members of various separatist groups from the northeastern Indian states. The ISI has denied these accusations.

In January 1993, the United States placed Pakistan on the watch list of such countries which were suspected of sponsoring international terrorism. This decision was made in part because the current head of the ISI in 1993, Lt. Gen. Javed Nasir, had become a stumbling block in American efforts to buy back hundreds of shoulder-fired, surface-to-air FIM-92 Stinger missiles from the Afghan Mujahideen and was assisting organizations such as Harkat ul-Ansar, which had been branded as a terrorist organization by the US. Once Nasir's tenure as ISI chief ended, the US removed Pakistan from the terrorism watch list.

After 9/11, ISI was supposedly purged of members who did not support President Pervez Musharraf's stance towards the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Newsreports in July 2008, however indicate that ISI may instead have chosen to merely suppress the activities of these individuals rather than remove them from office. Initially, the decision of the ISI to suddenly switch support to the United States went almost un-noticed. Several years later, it was revealed that the US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage had allegedly threatened to bomb Pakistan 'back to the Stone Age' if Pakistan did not support the US led War on Terror. This was according to President Musharraf and the ex-CIA chief George Tenet. It is known that Richard Armitage invited Pakistan's Ambassador Maleeha Lodhi and the-then ISI chief Mahmood Ahmed, who was in Washington, to his office on September 13, 2001, two days after the 9/11 attacks for talks, but Richard Armitage has denied using those words.[54]

In September 2006, President Pervez Musharraf has angrily rejected any allegations that Pakistan's intelligence service has indirectly helped the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The claims are in a document written by a researcher working for the UK's defence ministry. The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) paper says Pakistan's intelligence service, ISI, indirectly backs terrorism by supporting religious parties in the country. And he rejected the suggestion in the report that the ISI should be dismantled. President Musharraf responded by saying "I totally, 200% reject it. I reject it from anybody - MoD or anyone who tells me to dismantle ISI. The ISI is a disciplined force, breaking the back of al-Qaeda. Getting 680 top level Al-Qaeda and Taliban commanders would not have been possible if our ISI was not doing an excellent job."[55]

In July 2008, American intelligence agencies said that ISI officers helped plan the 2008 Indian embassy bombing in Kabul. They said that the ISI officers had not been renegades, indicating that their actions might have been authorized by superiors.[11]

During a visit to Washington for talks with President Bush, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani was handed a “chargesheet” by CIA chief Michael Hayden on the Inter-Services Intelligence links to militant activities and was told to “rein in the ISI” during their meeting in Washington. “Some information in the CIA chargesheet was so damning that the Pakistanis could not deny them,” a senior official familiar with the talks told the Dawn newspaper. The CIA chief, who met Gilani at a dinner, is believed to have told the Prime Minister that Pakistan will have to do something about the alleged involvement of ISI officials with militants.[56]

Some members of the American media and political establishment have questioned Pakistan's commitment in combating the Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants in border areas. The CIA has accused members of the ISI of "tipping off" militants before the US launches missile strikes against them in the tribal areas. This was told to the Pakistani Defence Minister Ahmad Mukhtar, who was speaking in Washington where he was accompanying Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani on his first visit to the United States. During talks, President Bush asked "Who is in charge of the ISI?"[57] In response, Pakistan has pointed to the deployment of nearly 80,000 troops in the border areas and the arrests of more than 700 Al Qaeda members, the most high profile ones including 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.

Western involvement in terrorism inside Pakistan

On July 8th, 2010, Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the Director General of ISI, categorically stated that foreign powers are involved in terrorist activities inside Pakistan. He said, "“The foreign powers are involved in terrorism and destabilization of the country.” During a briefing in the Parliament's National Security Committee session headed by Senator Raza Rabbani, DG ISI LTG Ahmed Shuja Pasha said that the western powers are involved in the terror activities inside the country.

The US policy against terrorism is under consideration and the changes will be brought with time in accordance with the national interest,” he said.[58] This is not a new claim inside Pakistan, many Pakistani political commentators have been speaking publicly about this phenomenon. It is alleged that terrorist activities inside Pakistan were actively carried out by the CIA, the RAW and the MOSSAD for different purposes. Chief among those, is changing the public perception of the War on Terror in the favor of the United States. There are confirmed reports that to achieve its objectives the CIA hired the services of at least a dozen Afghan warlords inside Afghanistan and provided through them arms and finances to militants in FATA and Swat to carry out murders and devastation in the country. It was like a double-edged sword not only to get the Army launch attacks against Taliban on Pakistani side of the border but also to give a message to the ISI that the CIA can use the Pakistani Taliban against their own security forces.[59] Thousands of people have been killed in Pakistan due to terror attacks since the beginning of war on terror. [60]

See also

Notes

  1. 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 "Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence". GlobalSecurity.org. http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/pakistan/isi.htm. Retrieved 2008-05-12. 
  2. 2.00 2.01 2.02 2.03 2.04 2.05 2.06 2.07 2.08 2.09 2.10 2.11 2.12 2.13 Pike, John (2002-07-25). "Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence". Federation of American Scientists. http://www.fas.org/irp/world/pakistan/isi/. Retrieved 2008-12-13. 
  3. 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 rakshak, Bharat. "ISI". http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LANCER/idr00006.htm. Retrieved 2008-05-12. 
  4. Shuja Nawaz. "Focusing the Spy Glass on Pakistan's ISI" The Huffington Post, 2 October 2008
  5. Altaf Gauhar. "How Intelligence Agencies Run Our Politics" The Nation, August 17, 1997
  6. "Changes in the Army High Command:Profiles of Yahya and Yaqub Khan" British High Commission, 5 May 1966
  7. Pakistan's 'godfathers of the Taliban' hold the key to hunt for bin Laden
  8. 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 Raman, B. "PAKISTAN'S INTER-SERVICES INTELLIGENCE (ISI)". http://www.acsa.net/isi/index.html. Retrieved 2006-05-05. 
  9. 9.00 9.01 9.02 9.03 9.04 9.05 9.06 9.07 9.08 9.09 9.10 Brigadier Syed A. I. Tirmazi (1985). Profiles of Intelligence. Combined Printers. Library of Congress Catalogue No. 95-930455. 
  10. Rashid, Ahmed, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia. Yale University Press, (2000), p.138, 231
  11. 11.0 11.1 Pakistanis aided attack in Kabul, Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, New York Times, Friday, August 1, 2008
  12. "Pakistan's ISI still supporting the Taliban, say Afghans - Pakistan's intelligence agency is directing Taliban attacks on Western targets in Afghanistan, Davood Moradian, a senior government official has claimed"
  13. "Pakistan's ISI intelligence agency 'supports' Taliban"
  14. "Pakistan puppet masters guide the Taliban killers"
  15. "Report slams Pakistan for meddling in Afghanistan"
  16. "New report on Pakistan connections with Taliban dismissed by military"
  17. "Pakistan Denies Supporting Taliban"
  18. "Pakistan's intelligence agency said to support Taliban"
  19. http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/front-page/ties-with-bad-guys-help-get-bad-guys-us-960
  20. 20.0 20.1 20.2 PAKISTAN'S INTER-SERVICES INTELLIGENCE (ISI), South Asia Analysis Group
  21. McGirk, Tim; Adiga, Aravind (2005-05-04). "War at the Top of the World". Time. p. 2. http://www.time.com/time/asia/covers/501050711/story2.html. 
  22. Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Federation of American Scientists
  23. Does Obama understand his biggest foreign-policy challenge?, Salon.com, 2008-12-12
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  29. http://www.rusi.org/go.php?structureID=commentary&ref=C4BACAEFC202EF
  30. http://www.rusi.org/go.php?structureID=commentary&ref=C4BACAEFC202EF
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  33. http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/04-cia-isi-spywar-qs-01
  34. Benjamin, Daniel & Steven Simon. "The Age of Sacred Terror", 2002
  35. Risen, James. "State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration", 2006
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  38. Transcript: Bin Laden determined to Strike in US CNN.com, Saturday April 10, 2004
  39. Andy Worthington The Guantanamo Files Pluto Press, 2007
  40. Tim McGirk, Anatomy of a Raid TIME Magazine, April 8, 2002
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  58. http://www.samaa.tv/News22453-Foreign_powers_behind_terrorism_DG_ISI.aspx
  59. http://www.opfblog.com/9872/why-dg-isi-confronted-director-cia/
  60. http://san-pips.com/index.php?action=ra&id=pvt_list_1

Further reading

External links